On Buddhism, Divination and the Worldly Arts: Textual Evidence from the Theravāda Tradition by Fiordalis, David
Linfield College 
DigitalCommons@Linfield 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship & Creative Works 
2014 
On Buddhism, Divination and the Worldly Arts: Textual Evidence 
from the Theravāda Tradition 
David Fiordalis 
Linfield College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.linfield.edu/relsfac_pubs 
 Part of the Buddhist Studies Commons, and the History of Religions of Eastern Origins Commons 
DigitalCommons@Linfield Citation 
Fiordalis, David, "On Buddhism, Divination and the Worldly Arts: Textual Evidence from the Theravāda 
Tradition" (2014). Faculty Publications. Published Version. Submission 3. 
https://digitalcommons.linfield.edu/relsfac_pubs/3 
This Published Version is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It is brought to you for free via open access, 
courtesy of DigitalCommons@Linfield, with permission from the rights-holder(s). Your use of this Published 
Version must comply with the Terms of Use for material posted in DigitalCommons@Linfield, or with other stated 
terms (such as a Creative Commons license) indicated in the record and/or on the work itself. For more 
information, or if you have questions about permitted uses, please contact digitalcommons@linfield.edu. 
  
On Buddhism, Divination and the 
Worldly Arts: Textual Evidence from the 
Theravåda Tradition 
 
David Fiordalis∗ 
 
Introduction 
 The categories of “Buddhism” and “divination” have not 
typically been combined in scholarly literature on either Buddhism 
or divination.1 More often than not they have been distinguished, 
giving the misleading impression that there is no such thing as 
“Buddhist divination.” When acknowledged, it has normally been 
interpreted as Buddhists engaging in “non-Buddhist” practices or 
as “indigenous” or “originally” non-Buddhist practices accreting to 
or entering into structural relations with Buddhism. Such 
distinctions as these have also informed the analytical repertoires 
used by scholars to understand the history, culture, and religion of 
places where Buddhism has flourished, and the apparent disconnect 
between what some Buddhist texts seem to say and what history 
and ethnography seem to show. Recently, however, scholars have 
begun to call for a different approach, one that “focuses on the way 
                                                        
∗ Department of Religious Studies, Linfield College, 900 SE Baker St., 
McMinnville, Oregon, USA 97128. Email: dfiordal@linfield.edu 
1 For example, preliminary research for this article yielded no entries for 
divination or astrology in Buswell’s 2004 Encyclopedia of Buddhism; nor 
did a cursory perusal of James Lewis’s 1994 The Astrology Encyclopedia 
provide any information on Buddhism. The 1985 first edition of the 
Encyclopedia of Religion contains a general entry on divination by Evan 
Zuesse, which has some discussion of Chinese divination but little specific 
discussion of Buddhism. A separate section on Greek and Roman divination 
was added for the 2005 edition. If one goes back to the Encyclopedia of 
Religion and Ethics, originally published between 1908 and 1927, one will 
find a short entry on Buddhist divination, written by Laurence A. Waddell, 
who naturally focused his discussion almost entirely on divination in 
Tibetan Buddhism. 
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in which [Buddhist] practitioners of divination viewed themselves, 
their divinatory practices, and their reasons for practicing 
divination.”2 
 Such studies are extremely important, because the 
distinctions between Buddhism and allegedly “non-Buddhist” 
practices remain entrenched, having been buttressed by the 
widespread modernist concern to distinguish religion from magic 
and magic from science. In this way divination usually becomes a 
form of magic, and Buddhism oscillates between being either a 
“pure” form of religion or more like a rational, secular science/ 
philosophy, or both, depending on whom you ask. This situation 
partly explains the proliferation of scholarly studies of “Buddhist 
magic.” It has also prompted scholars to call for renewed 
prioritization of traditional and indigenous categories. For instance, 
in a footnote on the use of the term magic, Justin McDaniel writes 
that it would be “helpful to pay close attention to indigenous terms 
that are often translated as ‘magic’ in English as much as possible 
when describing non-English-speaking practitioners” (McDaniel 
2011: 255). This is important advice, which I will attempt to follow 
in this essay. Yet the prioritization of indigenous categories runs a 
risk, if studies that engage such a process become as though 
hermetically sealed from broader comparative analyses and 
concerns. 
This essay attends to the sticky web of indigenous 
terminology concerning divination and other so-called “mundane” 
or “worldly” arts, focusing primarily upon Buddhist canonical texts 
preserved in Påli, augmented by references to commentarial and 
exegetical literature. It asks: How have some Buddhists, as evinced 
in this canonical and exegetical literature, understood the broader 
category of “worldly arts,” which includes techniques we call 
divinatory? Are Buddhists discouraged from engaging with such 
practices, as has been commonly asserted? If so, then for whom, 
                                                        
2 McGuire 2013: 413. McGuire’s article offers the most up-to-date discussion 
of divination in Chinese Buddhism and includes a helpful bibliography on 
divination in the Chinese context. The most recent survey of divination in 
East Asian religions is Guo 2012, which also includes useful theoretical 
reflection. Other studies that seem generally consistent with the approach 
McGuire advocates include McDaniel 2011, Brac de la Perrière 2012, and 
possibly also Phillipson 2007, which attempts to consider the categories of 
“Theravåda Buddhism” and “divination” together in a sympathetic way. 
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specifically, are such words of discouragement primarily meant? 
And why, specifically, are such practices discouraged? Are the 
penalties for practicing them severe or lenient? Are there any 
exceptions or instances when practicing worldly arts is tolerated or 
encouraged? And what might we conclude, more broadly, from the 
textual evidence? These tricky questions bear particularly upon the 
complex, legalistic body of Buddhist monastic rules and their 
interpretation, as well as the interpretation of a few passages from 
Buddhist canonical literature that are arguably less straightforward 
than has sometimes been assumed or asserted. 
Several of the texts examined here have been used to 
demonstrate that divinatory practices are not Buddhist, or anyway 
not “properly” or “originally” Buddhist, and that the Buddha 
himself discouraged them, and all of this despite the fact that such 
practices, broadly considered, appear widespread among Buddhists 
(including Buddhist monks) across various Buddhist traditions of 
South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Tibet.3 My focus on these 
texts should not be taken to indicate that I think these texts, 
canonical or otherwise, should be prioritized over individual 
practitioners’ beliefs and practices in determining what is properly 
Buddhist. On the contrary, textual studies require an informed 
knowledge of historical and contemporary belief and practice, even 
though contexts vary across time and place, and the lived realities 
that gave rise to the texts of the past are now largely lost. In 
addition to historical and ethnographic studies of Buddhist 
practitioners of divination, however, revisiting classical textual 
sources and lesser-known commentaries can help us to interrogate 
and better understand the ostensive connection or lack thereof 
among Buddhism, divination, and the so-called worldly arts. 
Since this essay remains fairly focused upon texts of the so-
called Theravåda tradition, I should add the disclaimer that 
                                                        
3 For China, see McGuire 2013 and the sources she recommends, as well as 
Guo 2012. For Southeast Asia, one may profitably consult Brac de la 
Perrière 2012, Terwiel 2012, and Quartich Wales 1983, in addition to 
McDaniel 2011. For Tibet, see especially Ekvall 1964 and his citations. On 
some of the more specific forms of divination practiced in Tibet, see Bacot 
1913 on mirror divination, and Laufer 1914 and Mortensen 2003 on crow 
divination. Mipham 1990 is a translation of a divination manual written in 
the 19th century by the influential Tibetan Buddhist scholar-monk Jamgon 
Mipham (’Jam mgon mi pham). Cornu 1997 is a general survey of Tibetan 
astrology. 
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Theravåda ought not be held up as the benchmark for “traditional 
Buddhism,” as has often been done. 4   Indeed, this misleading 
identification of Theravåda with traditional Buddhism has 
contributed to the misleading conclusion that the supposed 
“proliferation” of divinatory practices in Tibetan or Chinese 
Buddhism indicates that these traditions are less “traditional” (i.e., 
more influenced by “Mahåyåna Buddhism,” less rigorous with 
respect to monastic rules, and so on). While Tibet and China have 
their own “indigenous” and “Buddhist” traditions of divination and 
similar practices, and while Buddhist monks of these persuasions 
have engaged and certainly do engage with them, speaking about 
their growth or proliferation within Tibetan or Chinese Buddhism 
implies that Buddhist monks have not always been involved with 
them. Examining textual evidence in Påli can help us to evaluate 
this claim, and the broader contention that Buddhists throughout 
Asia, be they Tibetan or Thai, Sinhalese or Taiwanese, are 
necessarily doing something antithetical to Buddhist doctrine, if 
not practice, when they engage with divination and other so-called 
“worldly arts.” 
 
Defining Divination 
 Divination, like the overarching category term, magic, has 
often been applied in cross-cultural analyses in a rather imprecise 
manner. If magic has been fairly over-determined, over-theorized, 
and perhaps also over-criticized, then it seems to me that divination 
has not yet been defined with sufficient analytical clarity for 
comparative purposes. Take, for instance, the following definition 
excerpted from the Oxford English Dictionary: “the foretelling of 
future events or discovery of what is hidden or obscure by 
supernatural or magical means; soothsaying, augury, prophecy” 
(Simpson and Weiner 1989: IV. 892). Alternatively, in his article for the 
Encyclopedia of Religion, Evan Zuesse classifies divination into 
three categories. First, intuitive divination is defined as interpreting 
an immediate situation through the “spiritual insight” of the 
diviner. Second is “possession divination” or “spirit manipulation.” 
                                                        
4 Here I use the term Theravåda advisedly and simply to cover the range of 
Buddhist canonical and post-canonical materials written in Påli, and which 
form the main focus of this essay. For more on the problematic nature of the 
very category of Theravåda Buddhism, see Skilling, Carbine, Cicuzza, and 
Pakdeekham 2012.  
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Within this category, augury is distinguished from mediumship, 
spirit or deity possession, in that the former consists in divining 
messages sent by divinities through non-human creatures or things. 
Third is “wisdom divination,” which involves interpreting the 
operation of impersonal laws within a coherent divine order (Zuesse 
2005: 2370-2372). 
Both these definitions are extremely, if not impossibly, 
vague. A unifying theme appears to be knowledge and/or power of 
some sort over affairs of an unspecified nature, but these 
unspecified affairs might concern the past, present, or future, and 
the source or technique of knowledge or power is decidedly 
unclear. It may come from the “spiritual insight” of the diviner, 
whatever that is, or from another supernatural agent, contacted 
somehow. It may come from supernatural or magical means, 
whatever these might be. It may involve interpretation of the 
operation of impersonal laws within an overarching cosmic order, 
but precisely how this is different from “scientific” knowledge is 
not clearly specified.5 
One might well question whether the OED or the 
Encyclopedia of Religion’s entry on divination, sources that reflect 
little or no explicit awareness of Buddhism, are useful for 
understanding divinatory practices in Buddhism. They do provide 
us with a sense for one of our primary methodological problems, 
however, which is that we don’t know precisely what we mean by 
divination, making it difficult to identify what kind of practice we 
aim to classify by the hybrid expression “Buddhist divinatory 
practices.” They also suggest a second and related problem. While 
it can and does figure more positively in individual and collective 
self-definitions, divination, like magic and superstition, often 
carries strong pejorative connotations of irrationality, abnormality 
and otherness. Given that divination is a site of contesting 
valuations, of identity and difference, can it still serve as a value 
neutral term for comparative analysis, or how can it best serve as a 
scholarly category for understanding Buddhist doctrine and 
practice? 
In the Påli Buddhist literature considered here, the primary 
indigenous terms for divination are nemmita, nemmitika (or 
                                                        
5 See Ekvall 1964: 251–252, where a similar point is made about definitions 
of divination in general. 
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nemmitaka), and several others that fall under the broader category 
of tiraccha- or (more commonly) tiracchåna-vijjå. Nemmita occurs 
most famously in the Mahåpadåna-sutta of the D¥gha-nikåya, 
when King Bandhuma calls upon the brahman “diviners” 
(nemmitå, “those skilled in interpreting signs or omens”) to have a 
look at his son, Prince Vipass¥ (D, vol. 2: 16). They examine the 
prince, see the thirty-two marks of greatness on his body, and 
predict that he will become either a wheel-turning king or a 
buddha. In another passage, from the A∫guttara-nikåya, the term is 
used in the context of describing five impediments to rain that 
escape the eyes of the “forecasters” (nemmitå) (A, vol. 3: 243). 
Despite the fact that the first passage describes what would become 
an important narrative element in the standard blueprint of a 
buddha’s life, neither of the passages attributes the term nemitta to 
a Buddhist. However, the second passage implies that the Buddha 
can discern the causes and particular conditions for rainfall better 
than do the ostensibly non-Buddhist diviners. Does that make him 
a diviner himself, the divination expert par excellence? As we will 
see, the answer to this question depends in part on how we choose 
to engage the term as an analytical category. 
 
Divination and the Worldly Arts 
 The best-known reference in Buddhist canonical literature 
to the practice of divination, more broadly considered, occurs in a 
passage on s¥la or moral restraint that recurs in each of the 
discourses that make up the first division of the D¥gha-nikåya. In 
fact, this division is probably named the “Morality Section 
Division” (s¥lakkhandha vagga) because of the fact that all the 
discourses of that division – thirteen in total – contain this same 
passage with only minor alterations in the wording to reflect the 
different contexts in which it occurs in each discourse. Though the 
terms nemmita and nemmitika also appear in this passage, the key 
category term found here is tiracchåna-vijjå, an expression 
sometimes rendered broadly as “worldly arts,” though its precise 
definition and broader connotations are somewhat unclear and 
require further discussion.6 
                                                        
6 Often translators have opted to render the term with a greater sense of 
disapprobation than I have done here. Rhys Davids 2002: 14, gives “low 
arts”; Bodhi 2000: 1019, gives “debased arts”; Walshe 1995: 71, has “base 
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Before attending to the specific instances of these terms, 
however, a short description of the whole passage should prove 
helpful. In brief, it consists of a long list, or rather a list of lists, of 
various kinds of moral restraint or activities from which one ought 
to refrain. These moral restraints range from some that are central 
to Buddhist discussions of moral action, like the lists of five, eight, 
or ten moral precepts, to some apparently intended more 
specifically for monastics, to some that are less commonly 
discussed in Buddhist canonical or post-canonical literature, such 
the long list of so-called “worldly arts,” which is our focus here. 
The whole passage is divided into “small” (culla), “medium” 
(majjhima), and “large” (mahå), and this would seem to refer to the 
length of the lists contained within each subdivision, since the 
section titles appear to run contrary to the ethical significance of 
the lists contained in them. The “small” section contains some of 
the most basic or general moral restraints; the lists of the middle 
section appear more specific to “religious specialists” (samaˆa-
bråhmaˆå), including Buddhist monastics; the “large” section 
continues the theme by elaborating a very long list of tiracchåna-
vijjå or “worldly arts,” nearly one hundred and fifty of them by 
Richard Gombrich’s count (Gombrich 1997). 
In the Brahmajåla-sutta, the first sutta of the D¥gha-nikåya, 
the Buddha offers the whole passage as a list of activities in which, 
he claims, “common folk” (puthujjana), that is, non-Buddhists and 
“ordinary” Buddhists, praise him for not participating. So, common 
folk praise him for not harming living beings, for not taking what 
is not given to him, for not lying, and so forth. These are basic 
moral restraints found in the small section, towards the end of 
which the restraints begin to become more focused on the activities 
of “religious specialists,” ostensibly including Buddhist monastics. 
The middle section continues this trend, but also begins to 
elaborate with more prolixity upon, for instance, what specific 
types of shows the Buddha doesn’t attend or on what types of 
                                                                                                                            
arts”; Horner 2004: 337, gives “worldly knowledge,” but says in a footnote 
that “animal wisdom” is more literal; Gombrich 1997 goes for the rather 
more colorful “beastly arts,” though Rhys Davids 1991: 152, had mentioned 
earlier that the expression “literally” means “brutish, or beastly wisdom”; 
Langenberg 2014 offers “deviant lore.” Among these translators, only 
Horner chooses a more neutral option, and yet the Chinese translation of the 
term, as reflected in Heirman 2002: 761, would seem to support such an 
interpretation. 
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comfortable furniture he doesn’t sit, “while subsisting on food 
provided by the faithful” (saddhå deyyåni bhojanåni bhuñjitvå). 
Thirteen types of entertainment and twenty types of couches are 
mentioned. In the final sentence of middle section, the Buddha 
states: 
Monks, a common person (puthujjano), when praising 
the Tathågata, might say, “Whereas some renouncers and 
brahmans (samaˆa-bråhmaˆå), while subsisting on food 
provided by the faithful, are liars, prattlers, insinuators 
(nemmitikå), and disparagers, covetously pursuing gain upon 
gain, the ascetic Gotama refrains from such deception and 
prattle” (D, vol. 1: 8).7 
 Following this sentence begins an extensive list of various 
types of “worldly arts” (tiracchåna-vijjå) in which common folk 
praise the Buddha for not participating, a motley list that includes 
quite a few specific practices that we might call divinatory.  
 The Buddha continues, 
Or, monks, the common person, when praising the 
Tathågata, might say, “Whereas some renouncers and 
brahmans, while subsisting on food provided by the faithful, 
make a living through wrong means of livelihood, through 
worldly arts (tiracchåna-vijjåya) such as the following: [the 
science of the] body (a∫ga-[sattham]), [science of] signs 
(nimitta-[sattham]), 8  portents (uppåta), dreams (supina), 
physical marks (lakkhaˆa), the gnawings of mice 
(mËsikacchina). fire sacrifices (aggi-homa), [fire] sacrifices 
with a ladle (dabbi-homa), [fire] sacrifices with rice husks, 
[fire] sacrifices with rice powder, [fire] sacrifices with grains 
of rice, [fire] sacrifices with butter, [fire sacrifices with ghee, 
[fire] sacrifices with the mouth, [fire] sacrifices with blood; 
physiognomy (a∫ga-vijjå), geomancy (vatthu-vijjå), 
                                                        
7 Note the translation of the term nemittikå here. Rhys Davids translated the 
term as “diviner” (Rhys Davids 2002: 14). While the term does sometimes 
mean diviner, here it probably means “hinting” or “insinuation,” as it 
commonly does when it appears in this particular list of terms. See Cone 
2013: 641. 
8 D, vol. 1: 9. The words given in brackets have been supplied from the 
commentary (DA, vol. 1: 92), because many of these terms are rare and 
difficult to interpret without the help of the commentary. 
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geomancy (khatta-vijjå)9, skill with charms (siva-vijjå), skill 
with ghosts (bhËta-vijjå), skill with creatures living in the 
ground (bhËri-vijjå), skill with snakes (ahi-vijjå), skill with 
poison (visa-vijjå), skill with scorpions (vicchika-vijjå), mice 
augury (mËsika-vijjå), bird augury (sakuˆa-vijjå), crow 
augury (våyasa-vijjå), knowing a person’s lifespan (pakka-
jjhåna), protection against arrows (sara-parittåna), and 
[knowing the] animal world (miga-cakka) 10 —the ascetic 
Gotama refrains from such worldly arts as these.” 
 The above translation includes only the first of seven 
paragraphs listing various types of tiracchåna-vijjå.11 Already we 
begin to see the motley nature of the category, while subsequent 
paragraphs elaborate further on such practices as gemology, animal 
husbandry, geomancy, physiognomy, astronomy, astrology, 
forecasting the weather, predicting natural disasters, predicting 
current and future successes in battle or business, arranging 
auspicious times for marriages, mirror divination, spirit possession, 
sorcery, poetry, accounting, metaphysical speculation or “worldly 
knowledge” (lokåyata), and many types of medical practice, 
including prescribing emetics, purgatives and ointments, as well as 
practicing surgery and pediatrics. Upon surveying this long list of 
tiracchåna-vijjå, we are immediately confronted with a problem 
not dissimilar from the one we face in defining divination: the 
daunting breadth and heterogeneity of the category.  
 Also apparently obvious is the extent to which the passage 
tries to emphasize that the Buddha does not engage with such 
practices, that they are not appropriately “Buddhist.” When faced 
with such a broad condemnation, one might ask: Are the practices 
themselves problematic, or is the primary object of criticism the 
covetous intent behind the practices, make a living from such 
practices while subsisting on food provided by the faithful? Or are 
both problematic? Or does something else lie behind the apparent 
criticism of these practices? Who shouldn’t engage with them? 
                                                        
9 The commentary suggests that the difference between these two types of 
geomancy is that the former concerns houses while the latter concerns fields 
and plots of land.  
10 The commentary suggests that this refers specifically to recognizing animals 
based on the sounds they make. 
11 The list of tiracchåna-vijjå continues from page 9 to the middle of page 12, 
while the commentary on the list runs from pages 92 to 98. 
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These are important questions, but before attending to them, we 
ought first to see whether we can gain any further clarity on the 
meaning and nature of the practices generally classified as 
tiracchåna-vijjå, especially if we wish to understand whether and 
how some Buddhists conceptualized “divination.” 
 Another canonical passage, from the Samyutta-nikåya, 
offers a narrower range of practices representative of tiracchåna-
vijjå. It tells the story of an encounter between one of the Buddha’s 
foremost disciples, Såriputta, and a non-Buddhist, female ascetic 
name Sucimukh¥. She approaches Såriputta and asks whether he 
eats facing downwards, upwards, or in any of the ten directions. 
Såriputta says that he does not. So, Sucimukh¥ asks him how he 
does eat? In his response, Såriputta humorously correlates eating 
downwards, upwards, and facing the four intermediate directions 
with “religious specialists” who “make their living by wrong 
means of livelihood,” namely, by the “worldly arts” (tiracchåna-
vijjå) of “geomancy” (vatthu-vijjå), “astrology” (nakkhatta), and 
“physiognomy” (a∫ga-vijjå), respectively. He equates those who 
eat facing the four quarters of north, south, east and west with 
those who make their living by the wrong means of livelihood of 
running long errands and working as a messenger. “Sister,” says 
Såriputta by contrast, “I seek alms correctly (dhammika, that is, 
according to the Dhamma), and having sought it, I eat my alms 
correctly.” Suc¥mukh¥ then goes throughout the city proclaiming 
that the followers of the Buddha eat “correct” (dhammika) and 
“blameless” (anavajja) food, and urges people to give food to the 
followers of the Buddha.12 
 
Worldly Arts, Worldly Talk, and Wrong Means of Livelihood  
 In the examples above, the “worldly arts” are subsumed 
under the broader notion of “wrong means of livelihood” 
(micchåj¥va) and more specifically concern the way in which 
                                                        
12 S, vol. 3: 238–240. Much of this discourse is also cited in the encyclopedic 
compendium of Buddhist doctrine sometimes called the Mahåprajñå-
påramitå-śåstra, which was partially translated from Chinese and 
extensively annotated by Etienne Lamotte (1981: 199–202). McBride 2005 
(especially pp. 94–95, and footnote 30) also cites this passage, but reads it 
as affirming straightforwardly that Buddhist monks practice divination. 
McBride’s interpretation appears to disagree with both the Påli text and 
Lamotte’s translation of the Chinese. 
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“religious specialists,” including Buddhist monks, “make their 
living” (j¥vikaµkappenti). As a passage in the commentary on the 
Sucimukh¥-sutta (SA, vol. 2: 247) discussing geomancy makes clear: 
“They earn a living by wrong means of livelihood” 
means that they earn a living by precisely such wrong means 
of livelihood considered to be the worldly art of geomancy. 
They live subsisting off the provisions given by people 
pleased by the preparing of those sites. That is the meaning. 
 A canonical passage from the Cullaniddesa (Cn 258) makes 
this connection even more explicit by contrasting people who 
acquire and consume things blamelessly and those who do so in a 
blameworthy fashion: 
Concerning “those who do not accumulate [possessions] 
and enjoy [things, particularly food and clothing] 
blamelessly,” there is the person who enjoys [things] in a 
blameworthy fashion and there is the person who enjoys 
[things] in a blameless fashion. And what type is the person 
who enjoys [things] in a blameworthy fashion? Here, such a 
person makes a living through deceit, prattle, insinuation 
(nemittika), and disparagement, covetously pursuing gain 
upon gain. [He makes a living by] offerings (dåna) of wood, 
offerings of bamboo, offerings of leaves (patta), offerings of 
flowers, offerings of fruits, offerings of baths, offerings of 
soft powders (cuˆˆa), offerings of coarse powders (ma††ikå), 
offerings of toothbrushes (dantaka††ha), and offerings of 
rinse-water for the mouth (mukhodaka). [He makes a living] 
through bribery with bean-soup (muggasËpyatå, though 
bean-soup-ness?), with nourishment (påribha†yatå), and with 
a soft seat (p¥†hamaddikatåya). [He makes a living] through 
geomancy, worldly arts (tiracchånavijjå), physiognomy, and 
astrology.  [He makes a living] through running long 
errands, being a messenger, being a walking gofer 
(ja∫ghapesaniya). [He makes a living] through practicing 
medicine (vejjakamma), making repairs (navakamma), 
serving out alms, and administering offerings. He makes a 
living, having obtained, acquired, achieved, and gained 
goods by [such] incorrect (adhamma), improper (visama) 
[means]. Such a person is called one who enjoys [things] in a 
blameworthy fashion. 
 In the passage cited above, a number of different activities 
come together under the general category of wrong means of 
livelihood, including some activities we have already seen and 
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some we have not. Interestingly and unusually, “worldly arts” 
(tiracchånavijjå) appears here as an individual member of a subset 
of four terms that also includes geomancy, physiognomy, and 
astrology. In the later commentary on the parallel passage in the 
Mahåniddesa (MnA, vol 2: 401), we find these four terms explained 
further: 
In respect to “not by geomancy” and so forth, the science 
of knowing whether a village, a market town, a house, and so 
forth is well positioned or ill positioned is called geomancy. 
An art that does not lead one out (aniyyånikattå) [of the 
cycle of rebirth], [and] that runs crosswise/horizontal to the 
paths [leading to] heaven or liberation (saggamokkha-
maggånaµ tiracchåna bhËtå), such as the science of 
physiognomy (a∫gasattha), omens (nimitta), and so forth 
[and] the remaining arts (avasesa vijjå), is called a worldly 
art (tiracchåna vijjå). Knowing whether a man or woman is 
lucky or unlucky by the marks on the body is called 
physiognomy. The science of knowing connections with the 
stars is called astrology. 
 Here the commentary apparently attempts to weave 
together information drawn from the morality section and the 
Sucimukh¥-sËtta to normalize and explain the unusual set of four. 
At the same time it includes a gloss on the term tiracchåna-vijjå 
similar to one we find in several other places in the commentaries 
that explain the expression “worldly talk” (tiracchåna-kathå): that 
such talk does not lead to liberation, but rather runs crosswise to 
attaining it or heavenly rebirth (DA, vol. 1: 88). 
 K. R. Norman, who has treated this expression in one of his 
lexicographical studies, suggests that this explanation has all the 
trappings of a folk etymology. Although the term tiracchåna 
(possibly for tiraßcina in Sanskrit, as derived from tiryac or 
tiryañc) literally means oblique, transverse, horizontal, sideways, 
or awry—Edgerton (1953: 253) suggests that related tiras may also 
mean “outside”—the term commonly refers to animals of all sorts, 
as they generally move horizontally across the earth. Being limited 
to relatively few instances in the canonical and commentarial 
literature, however, tiracchåna-vijjå and tiracchåna-kathå look 
like idiomatic expressions. The latter appears to refer to everyday 
or idle topics of conversation. The standard list from the morality 
section enumerates such topics: 
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Talk of kings, thieves, great ministers, armies, fears, 
battles, food, drink, clothing, beds, garlands, perfumes, 
relatives, vehicles, villages, small towns, cities, countries, 
women, alcohol, streets, wells, those who have died, diverse 
topics, speculation about the world, speculation about the 
ocean, and about becoming or not becoming this or that.13 
 Norman points out that the same list is enumerated 
elsewhere in the canon, but called “village talk” (gåma-kathå), and 
described as “worthless” (h¥nå), “associated with the village” 
(gammå), “common” (pothujjanikå), “ignoble” (anariyå) and 
“unconnected with the goal” (anatthasaµhitå), that is, liberation.14 
In a somewhat similar manner, the commentary on the nuns 
monastic code glosses the term tiracchåna-vijjå as “foreign” 
(båhirakam) and “unconnected with the goal” (anatthasaµhitå).15 
 These passages suggest broader and somewhat more vague 
notions about what precisely constitutes tiracchåna-vijjå, apart 
from the fact that such practices seem clearly defined as non-
Buddhist or at least not appropriately Buddhist. The 
Dvemåtikåpå¬i, a later Burmese compilation of monastic rules and 
commentary upon them, seems to confirm this impression, while 
further muddying the water on the precise nature and scope of 
tiracchåna vijjå: 
[The expression] mundane art [refers to] whatever art 
that is foreign (båhiraka), does not achieve the goal [of 
Buddhism] (anatthasaµhita), [and] is used to harm others 
(parËpaghåtakara), particularly [such arts as] training in 
elephants (hatthi), horses (assa), and chariots (ratha), 
training in swordsmanship and archery (dhanutharusippa), 
and use of mantras (manta) and tonics (agada), such as those 
from the Atharva Veda (åthabbaˆa), to harden (khilana) 
others [that is, to kill them], to gain mastery over others 
                                                        
13 D, vol. 1: 8–9. The translation mostly follows Rhys Davids 2002: 13–14. No 
animals are specifically mentioned, nor are these topics animals are likely 
discuss with one another, except perhaps in the Pañcatantra. For his part, 
Norman suggests that the list once did include a reference to animals, which 
has since dropped out. See Norman 1993: 156. 
14 M, vol. 3: 113. See Norman 1993: 155. 
15 V, vol. 4: 305. See Horner 2004: 337. 
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(vas¥karaˆa), and to dry out (sosåpana) others’ bodies [that 
is, to mummify them?], and the rest.16 
 Here we see specific mention of the condition that such 
practices have the purpose of doing harm to others. Thus, certain 
types of basic training in warfare are highlighted alongside a 
variety of practices that we might consider “magic” of a 
particularly sinister variety. Note the absence here of many of the 
basic divinatory practices emphasized in preceding citations. 
Instead, the passage seems to emphasize not only a certain array of 
practices, but also the intent to harm. 
 Another passage, from the Khuddasikkhå and 
MËlasikkhå—monastic manuals that Charles Hallisey (1990: 207) 
has explained as being written to “provide even more practical 
guidance”—describes tiracchåna-vijjå as follows: 
[Activities] that increase desire, hatred and confusion 
(rågadosamoha-va∂∂håni), [activities] condemned by the 
Buddha and the rest (buddhådi-garahitå), [activities] 
moving, going, proceeding crossways (tiro), or horizontally 
(tiriyato) to heaven and liberation, [such as] poetry, dance 
and so forth (kabbanå†akådikå), all those fields of 
knowledge (sabbåpi vijjå), or it should be known to be 
comprised of what is verily not in accordance with the 
discipline (vinayayuttitopi), having ascertained the practice 
of the discipline by what goes along [with it] and what 
important [rules] should be upheld  (KM, 399). 
 In addition to elaborations upon the folk etymology, this 
passage emphasizes the Buddha’s condemnation of such activities, 
perhaps making oblique reference to the morality section of the 
D¥gha-nikåya, and provides the added idea that such practices 
actually increase the root afflictions. Again, the focus is on certain 
practices, but also upon intent, and the relationship between action 
and intent. After mentioning poetry and dance as particular types 
of such activities, the passage concludes with a seemingly more 
general statement that the worldly arts comprise whatever activities 
are deemed not to accord with the monastic discipline! 
 
 
                                                        
16 Dm, 334. This same passage is also found in the Vinayavinicchaya-Ṭikå 
(VvṬ, vol. 2: 98). 
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Should Monks and Nuns Practice Worldly Arts?  
 These last two examples come from compendia of and 
exegetical works upon the section of the Buddhist canonical 
literature that most directly concerns the regulations governing the 
behavior of Buddhist monks and nuns. The canonical and 
commentarial literature on the monastic code also contains two 
instances in which the practice of “worldly arts” is specifically 
mentioned. One is the fifth section of the Cullavagga, a 
miscellaneous section on what are called “minor matters” 
concerning the behavior of monks. 17  The second is the nuns’ 
monastic code or påtimokkha itself, in a section on minor 
infractions (påcittiya) requiring confession. 18  This may be a 
significant point: Whereas the nuns' code does contain an explicit 
rule prohibiting the practice of “worldly arts,” the monks’ code 
does not, the discussion in the Cullavagga notwithstanding.19 
 The passage in question in the nuns’ section of the Vinaya 
begins: 
At that time, the Blessed One was staying in Såvatth¥ in 
the Jeta Grove in the forest retreat of Anåthapiˆ∂ika. At that 
same time, the group of six nuns learned the worldly arts. 
People complained, criticized and denounced them, saying 
“Why, indeed, are nuns mastering the worldly arts, just as 
though they were householders enjoying [material] 
pleasures!” 
The Buddha comes to learn about the criticism and makes a 
rule prohibiting nuns from mastering the worldly arts. A second 
                                                        
17 V, vol. 2: 138. See Horner 2001: 194–195. 
18 V, vol. 4: 305-306. See Horner 2004: 337ff. 
19 This might be what Gombrich has in mind when he describes the prohibition 
on monks “taking an interest” in “such matters” as astrology as a “principle” 
and “not a formal rule.” See Gombrich 1988: 205. Though her main focus is 
more specifically on the healing arts, Amy Langenberg has recently 
speculated on the possible reasons for what she perceives as a 
“disproportionate focus on nuns” in these and related prohibitions in 
Buddhist Vinaya collections. See Langenberg 2014. Incidentally, the 
monks’ code does seem to have an explicit rule pertaining to the practice of 
tiracchåna-kathå. See V, vol. 4: 165, and vol. 1: 188ff. However, Norman 
notes that the passage does not specifically prohibit tiracchåna-kathå, but 
rather monks entering the village at the wrong time. See Norman 1993: 
155–156, and Horner 2004: 82, especially footnote 3.  
94 The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 15, 2014 
rule closely follows this one, focusing on nuns teaching the 
worldly arts to others. A brief commentarial paragraph lists certain 
exceptions to these rules: “It isn’t a fault, if she masters ‘writing’ 
(lekha), ‘mneumonics’ (dhåraˆa), ‘protective utterances’ (paritta) 
for the purposes of protection, if she is crazy (ummattikå), or if she 
is a first-time offender.”20  These exceptions aside, the passages 
offer no specific definition of the “worldly arts.” However, the 
language of the criticism leveled against the nuns seems to echo 
other passages and suggests that making a living or earning 
material benefit from the practice of the worldly arts is the main 
problem. 
 Thus, the question becomes whether the practices 
themselves are improper for some reason, or if the attitude or intent 
behind them is more important. I tend to agree with Gombrich 
(1997: 175) when he writes: “The main point is that it is wrong to 
make a living out of these practices, to do them for profit.” This 
seems to place the emphasis on the intent behind the practice.21 
There seems to be a close connection drawn between monks and 
nuns practicing the worldly arts, making a living by wrong means 
of livelihood, and acquiring material possessions. While there may 
be something objectionable about the practices themselves, the 
broad scope of what might legitimately be included in the category 
of the worldly arts, combined with a relative lack of serious 
punishment for practicing them, suggests that the censure may be 
largely rhetorical in nature. Again, citing Gombrich (1988: 205), “a 
breach of this principle [that monks take no interest in the worldly 
arts]...was no doubt a common and trivial occurrence.”  
 Rhetoric can still become reality, as attested by the Kalyåni 
inscriptions erected by King Dhammacet¥ in 1476. The inscriptions 
testify to one of the purification reforms of the Buddhist monastic 
institution undertaken periodically by Burmese kings. In this case, 
the inscriptions mention practicing the worldly arts, such as the 
                                                        
20 V, vol. 4: 306. The passages in the Cullavagga are virtually identical, apart 
from the gender, though they are shorter, without commentary, and the 
offense is deemed less serious, a dukka†a rather than a påcittiya. 
21 I would further suggest that this line of reasoning seems largely consistent 
with John Strong’s recent reinterpretation of the rule prohibiting monks and 
nuns from displaying superhuman powers in front of laypeople, a rule found 
in the same section on miscellaneous minor offences in the Påli Vinaya. V, 
vol. 2: 110–112, and Strong 2012. 
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medical arts, carpentry, arithmetic, and so on, as one of the reasons 
for “sinful” monks being expelled from the monastic institution 
during the reform, a punishment well out of proportion with the 
monastic code (Taw 1892: 99–100).  Yet, one would be hard-pressed, 
I think, to conclude from such rhetoric that the apparently 
widespread practice of the worldly arts among Buddhist monks at 
the time was truly the motivating reason behind the monastic 
reform. 
 
Buddhist Divination? 
 In spite of an apparent trend towards vagueness and 
rhetoric in defining the overall class of so-called “worldly arts,” 
some scholars have found descriptive historical value in the long 
lists of fairly specific, if obscure, practices that we find proscribed 
in the morality section. For instance, David Pingree, the leading 
authority on ancient Near Eastern and Indian astrological systems, 
published a short essay that drew attention to similarities between 
the D¥gha-nikåya and some Mesopotamian omen manuals. The 
similarities he saw occur both in the basic terminology and in the 
specific ordering of the terms in the list. He thus hypothesized that 
Mesopotamian omen manuals had a direct influence on Indian 
systems of divination. He surmised that this contact was facilitated 
by the spread of the Achaemenid Empire into Northwest India and 
the Indus Valley. 22  Whether or not Pingree’s hypotheses are 
correct, the evidence indicates that such practices were associated 
with at least some members of a generic class of “religious 
specialists” in ancient India, a class that generally included the 
Buddha and Buddhist monks and nuns. Perhaps the evidence even 
suggests the commonality or popularity of such practices among 
Buddhists. As Richard Gombrich (1997: 174) puts it: “As so often, 
we find out most about what people were up to, or might have been 
up to, from texts telling them what they were not allowed to be up 
to.”  Yet, one wonders how much closer we are to an understanding 
of the specific nature of the practices intended by the terms, and 
their significance, that is, why Buddhists might wish to learn or 
practice them and why other Buddhists may have thought them 
objectionable for the Buddhist monk or nun.  
                                                        
22 Pingree 1992: 375–379. See also Knudsen 2008. For a general survey of 
Indian systems of divination, see Esnoul 1968. 
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 The distancing or “othering” effect we see in these 
passages, which works to distinguish the attitudes and activities of 
the proper Buddhist monastic from those of a similar class of 
“others,” results in a blanket characterization of what appear to be 
many different kinds of activity under a common, general category. 
In this way, one might perceive an interesting parallel with modern 
western definitions of divination. In the modern case, however, the 
distinction has been drawn not only between religion and magic, 
but also between magic and science. Does the same set of 
distinctions also hold in the case of our Buddhist examples? Is the 
PTS dictionary accurate, for instance, when it glosses tiracchåna-
vijjå as “pseudo-science”? (Rhys Davids and Stede 1921–1925: 303). For 
this to be so, I would argue, these Buddhist texts would have had to 
distinguish not only between religion and magic in a more 
traditional sense, but also between magic and science in a more 
modern sense. In other words, one would need to see doubt clearly 
expressed about the practical, this-worldly efficacy of such 
practices, and not simply doubt about their efficacy for the 
purposes of achieving liberation. It is true that Gombrich has 
sensed skepticism about the efficaciousness of the practices in the 
fact that the passage in the morality section says that the food is 
“given in faith.”23 Yet, I can see no clear distinction made there or 
elsewhere between good and bad science or between efficacious 
and inefficacious mundane technologies. Therefore, if a sense of 
“magic” does remain about the category of tiracchåna-vijjå, it 
seems the more classical sense of magic drawn in contrast to true 
religion: magic seen as mundane technique or skill with utilitarian 
purpose and possibly even malevolent intent. 
 This contrast may become clearer when we consider two 
additional passages from Buddhist canonical literature.  Both 
passages feature the Buddha performing “divinations” (in a broad, 
neutral sense of the term) through the use of his special powers, 
particularly his knowledge of the arising and passing away of 
living beings, or what is sometimes called the “divine eye” 
(dibbacakkhu). Even though it is often classified as “worldly” 
                                                        
23 Gombrich 1997: 174. In an earlier publication, however, Gombrich writes: 
“...the Buddha himself condemned astrology, palmistry and all similar 
practices, though his condemnation was specifically directed against their 
practice by monks: he did not deny their possible validity, but declared them 
a distraction from the road to salvation.” See Gombrich 1971: 148–149. 
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(lokiya), the divine eye is not normally classified as a “worldly art” 
(tiracchåna-vijjå). Instead, it features as one of several powers that 
stand at the heart of certain canonical articulations of Buddhist 
awakening and the liberating knowledge and power entailed by it.24 
The Buddha’s knowledge of the arising and passing away of living 
beings appears to justify in an epistemological sense the enormous 
genre of Buddhist narrative literature known as apadåna or 
avadåna, stories in which the Buddha repeatedly and without 
hesitation “divines” the karmic connections among past, present, 
and future actions and circumstances. In this way, the notion of the 
divine eye or knowledge of the arising and passing away of beings 
nicely captures what Robert Ekvall (1964: 253–254) calls the spatial 
and temporal dimensions of divination. 
 There are many instances in Buddhist canonical literature in 
which the Buddha uses his divine eye. Both passages I want to 
consider come from the second section of the D¥gha-nikåya. One is 
the Janavasabha-sutta, and the other is found in the well-known 
Mahåparinibbåna-sutta, which tells of the Buddha’s final days 
before passing into nirvåˆa. 25  Both passages relate certain 
happenings at the “Brick Hall” (giñjakåvasatha) at Nådikå. The 
Janavasabha-sutta begins by describing an instance in which the 
Buddha is “foretelling (byåkaroti) the rebirths of his followers up 
and down the countryside whose time had come and had recently 
died” (D, vol. 2: 200). News of the Buddha’s words spreads around 
the community to the great delight and amazement of his followers. 
Ónanda then hears the news and wonders why the Buddha has not 
explained any of the rebirths of his devotees in other countries like 
Magadha, where people like the famous King Bimbisåra had lived 
and died. After Ónanda asks him about this apparent oversight and 
he mulls it over in his mind, the Buddha sits down and resolves, “I 
shall know their place (gati) and condition of rebirth 
(abhisamparåya),” and he does so. The Buddha then proceeds to 
inform Ónanda, and Ónanda informs others, and thus the Buddha’s 
message spreads widely among the populace. In this discourse, no 
criticism is made of the Buddha’s practice, nor is any suggestion 
made that the Buddha doesn’t engage in such matters. It seems a 
perfectly normal thing for him to do.  
                                                        
24 For an overview of these concepts in Påli canonical literature, see Clough 
2010. 
25 The former is found at D, vol. 2: 200–219, and the latter at D, vol. 2: 91–94. 
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 The Mahåparinibbåna-sutta tells another episode of the 
Buddha performing divination. During his final tour about the 
country, the Buddha again visits the Brick Hall at Nådikå, and 
perhaps in an allusion to the Janavasabha-sutta, Ónanda asks the 
Buddha to divine the fates of several Buddhists who have died 
there. The Buddha begins to do so, but soon grows weary of 
divining the fates of each and every person; he is, after all, nearing 
the end of his life. He proceeds to teach Ónanda a method he calls 
the “Mirror of Dharma” (dhamma-ådåsa). This method turns out 
simply to be faith in the Buddha, his teachings, and community, 
but by means of it, the Buddha claims, the Buddhist devotee may 
discern his own fate. The phrase dhamma-ådåsa evokes an 
expression found in the long list of “worldly arts,” namely ådåsa-
pañha or “mirror divination,” literally “questions by means of a 
mirror.”  
 Despite certain differences, both these passages depict the 
Buddha as agreeing without apparent hesitation to perform what 
one may well wish to call “divinations,” though in a way that 
upholds the Buddhist Dharma and relies upon particular categories 
the tradition deemed central to it. In this way, one may perceive the 
problem with limiting our understanding of divination in Buddhism 
to the so-called “worldly arts.” By doing so, one unwittingly 
highlights certain passages that seem to deny, almost by definition, 
the very existence of Buddhist divination. Consequently, one may 
well overlook evidence like the Janavasabha-sutta or the 
Mahåparinibbåna-sutta, or if one does take such evidence into 
account, then one interprets it as describing something other than 
divination. Alternatively, one might account for the difference by 
placing greater emphasis on the intentions behind the actions rather 
than the actions themselves. In either case, the concept of 
divination appears as a site for contesting valuations, of identity 
and difference, posing a problem for those who would apply a 
single, value neutral concept of divination to a matrix of terms that 
exist in a state of tension. 
 
"Worldly" and "Otherworldly" 
 This same tension is expressed within Buddhist discourse 
by the distinction between so-called “this-worldly” (lokiya, lokika) 
and “otherworldly” (lokuttara) orientations or values. This 
distinction must be among the indigenous Buddhist scholastic 
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classifications to have been employed most commonly in modern 
analyses of Buddhism. It has often been used to distinguish 
Buddhist from non-Buddhist, and to supply the Buddhist 
“equivalent” of the distinction between the religious and the 
secular or the sacred and profane. 26  More recently it has come 
under criticism for failing to encapsulate the complexity of 
Buddhism on the ground. After briefly discussing the lokiya/ 
lokuttara opposition and its commonplace application to Theravåda 
Buddhism, not only by scholars but by educated, modern Thai 
Buddhists influenced by modern scholarly representations of 
Buddhism, Justin McDaniel (2011: 115) concludes: “The lokiya/ 
lokottara [sic] distinction is not very useful in describing Thai 
monastic life.” “Many Thai monks are multitaskers,” he explains, 
but he goes further. If we remove the mundane from the 
supramundane, if we associate the worldly with magic and 
characterize it as non-Buddhist, McDaniel argues, then this 
effectively removes agency from thousands of practicing Thai 
Buddhists and makes their everyday concerns and activities 
something tangential to Thai Buddhist life.  
 While I substantially agree with McDaniel’s point, I do not 
think the lokiya/lokuttara distinction is itself the problem. Rather, 
the way it has often been utilized has not helped to show how 
closely the practices and beliefs designated by these terms are 
intertwined in many Buddhist understandings. The distinction has 
less commonly been perceived as embodying an internal tension 
within Buddhism, which is the line of interpretation I want to 
pursue here. For support, I want to draw upon several passages that 
deploy the lokiya/lokuttara distinction.  
 In the Milindapañha, for instance, King Milinda asks how 
the Buddha could have had previous teachers, yet still say that he 
has no teacher, no equal, no rival in the world of gods and men. 
The Buddhist monk Någasena explains that the Buddha’s previous 
teachers, including the eight specialists who interpreted the marks 
upon his body at birth, the Brahmin expert in the Vedic sciences 
who taught him as a boy, the god who inspired him to renounce the 
world, and his first two meditation teachers who taught him while 
he was still practicing asceticism were all “his teachers in regard to 
                                                        
26 See, for instance, Ames 1964, Spiro 1975, Tambiah 1970, and Gombrich 
1971 and 1997. 
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the dharma (teaching, reality) of the world” (åcariye lokiye 
dhamme). “Yet, in regard to this dharma that is preeminent in the 
world (imasmin ca lokuttare dhamme),” Någasena continues, 
“there is no teacher surpassing the Tathågata (natthi tathågatassa 
anuttaro anusåsako) who could have led him to comprehend the 
knowledge of the all-knowing ones” (sabbaññuta ñåˆa 
pa†ivedhåya) (Mp 236). In this way, Någasena resolves the apparent 
inconsistency, and emphasizes the preeminence of the Buddha and 
his insight over other forms of “worldly” knowledge. He does not 
deny that the Buddha had worldly teachers or possessed worldly 
knowledge. 
 The way I have translated lokuttara here might seem 
controversial, but I am emboldened to do so in part by a comment 
that Justin McDaniel makes in a footnote: “[John] Holt noted in his 
2004 keynote address at the Exploring Theravada conference at the 
National University of Singapore that lokuttara is often 
mistranslated and should be read as ‘pre-eminent in this world,’ not 
as ‘otherworldly’ or ‘non-worldly’.”27 I agree with Holt, but would 
add that lokuttara can suggest both meanings, otherworldly and 
preeminent in this world, simultaneously. The Buddha and his 
teachings and activities are lokuttara in both senses of the term in 
that what is reckoned preeminent in the world is also what leads to 
the highest goal of liberation from the world. Accordingly, for the 
Buddhist apologist, only the Buddhist path would lead to this goal, 
for it is the one based on the Buddha’s authentic, liberating insight. 
In similar fashion, a Buddha’s awakening is commonly described 
as anuttara, “unexcelled.” Thus, lokuttara may be shorthand for 
“Buddhist,” but only in a particular rhetorical or ideological sense.  
 By extension, lokiya, “this-worldly,” would not necessarily 
mean “non-Buddhist,” but not exclusively Buddhist, that is, shared 
among many traditions.28 Insofar as the Buddha also possesses such 
an array of “worldly” knowledge and powers, another implication 
is that these are techniques with which the Buddha engages the 
world out of compassion. One finds a noteworthy example of this 
usage in the Påli commentaries, where the Buddha’s “teaching 
                                                        
27 McDaniel 2011: 255, note 98. 
28 David Seyfort Ruegg has pursued this line of reasoning in several 
publications, though not without criticism. See Seyfort Ruegg 1964, 2001, 
and 2008.  
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knowledge” (desanå-ñåˆa) is called “worldly” (lokiya) and is said 
to “arise from compassion” (karu˜å-pabhåvitaµ), in contrast to the 
Buddha’s “penetrating knowledge” (pa†ivedha-ñåˆa), which is 
called “supramundane” (lokuttara) and is said to “arise from 
insight” (paññå-pabhåvitaµ). Interestingly, however, both these 
forms of knowledge are said to be “unique to Buddhas” 
(buddhånaµyevaorasaµ) and “not shared with others” 
(aññehiasådhåranaµ).29 
 These latter passages do not directly concern the so-called 
“worldly arts” (tiracchåna-vijjå), practices that the passages 
discussed earlier generally seem to consider foreign to Buddhism 
and not oriented towards the goal of the Buddhist path. Instead, the 
commentary here explains that the Buddha might engage the world 
out of compassion through the use of knowledge and powers that 
the tradition generally considers central to Buddhism. However, 
the passages do suggest one way in which a Buddhist practitioner 
of divination might explain how divinatory practices could 
resonate with Buddhist soteriological values. Garry Phillipson 
(2007) begins to suggest other ways in which divinatory practices 
might be so conceived. Moreover, H. G. Quartich Wales, in his 
study of divination in modern Thailand, informs us that Buddhist 
monks specializing in it, including respected abbots of monasteries, 
model their behavior on that of Moggallåna (Quartich Wales 1983: ix). 
Among the Buddha’s foremost disciples, he is the monk most 
renowned for his superhuman powers. Thus, although the so-called 
“super knowledges” (abhiññå) and “worldly arts” (tiracchåna 
vijjå) seem mutually exclusive categories at first glance, perhaps 
Buddhist practitioners of divination and other worldly arts perceive 
a stronger connection between them. Certainly, they both seek to 
straddle the tension in Buddhism between this-worldly and 
otherworldly values and orientations in a productive fashion. 
 
Conclusion 
 The questions of the place of divination and the so-called 
“worldly arts” in Buddhist doctrine, and whether Buddhist monks 
and nuns ought to engage in such practices, and if not, then why 
not, all appear less obvious than many scholars have previously 
                                                        
29 See Endo 1997: 81, and the several primary sources he cites there. 
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thought. The category of “worldly arts” seems rather vague in 
itself, and the formal and less formal prohibitions against their 
practice by Buddhist monks and nuns are arguably unclear with 
respect to what precisely the main problem is: the practices 
themselves, whatever they might be; making a living from such 
practices; or the intention behind the practices. Moreover, certain 
other practices or techniques that an outside observer might well 
consider divinatory, but that the tradition calls by different names 
and, for one reason or another, appears to consider properly 
Buddhist, are not condemned and are even encouraged.  
 This hermeneutical situation should prompt a broader 
consideration of how we conceive and apply analytical categories 
in the study of Buddhism. Rather than critically considering the 
meanings of terms and the contexts for their usage in traditional 
Buddhist discourses, certain concepts have been taken to provide 
indigenous structural oppositions that could be exploited in order 
to draw analytical contrasts between religion and magic and 
between magic and science. This reflects a common concern found 
in numerous strands of intellectual and everyday discourse in 
modern times. I do not wish to separate “Buddhism” too much 
from “us,” for indeed the central theoretical standpoint of this essay 
has been that it is both necessary and useful to consider them 
together. However, we need to be careful about seeing Buddhism 
through the prism of our own preconceived analytical structures. 
Given the subtleties and differences of context, we also must 
remain cautious about reproducing Buddhist rhetorical self-
understandings, and using them as guiding principles in our 
academic studies of Buddhism without critical reflection on the 
particular circumstances in which such particular understandings 
are generated and diffused.  
 When seen in the light of our comparative analysis, neither 
the rational/irrational dichotomy nor that between science and 
pseudo-science—distinguishing which has been such a strong 
modern concern even among apologists for the category of 
religion—seems to be clearly reflected in the classical Buddhist 
literature we have examined in this essay. Nevertheless, on the 
interpretation offered here, Buddhist literature depicts Buddhists as 
being very much engaged in the affairs of this world, and the 
supposedly “otherworldly” rhetoric reflects and can even be made 
to justify this engagement. Therefore, perhaps the question we 
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should be asking isn’t so much where forms of divination practiced 
by Buddhists originated, or whether they are “Buddhist” or “non-
Buddhist,” or whether Buddhist monastics should or should not be 
practicing them. There seems to be ample evidence that they do, 
and probably always have, despite the ambivalences in the tradition 
towards doing so. Instead, echoing McGuire, I would argue that we 
should be attending more carefully to what it means that Buddhist 
monastics practice divination, how those who do perform 
divinations understand what they are doing, and how we might 
better understand Buddhism and ourselves in light of this fact. 
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